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The Twenty-First Century Poll Tax
by RYAN A. PARTELOW*

Introduction
In 2008, Randi Lynn Williams of Dothan, Alabama, lost her right to
vote when she was convicted of fraudulent use of a credit card.1 Although
she served her sentence of probation and a few months in prison, she is still
currently unable to vote.2 Although many states have abolished or
liberalized their laws disenfranchising convicted felons in recent years,3 in
Alabama and many other states, individuals convicted of a felony cannot
regain their voting rights until they pay off the financial obligations resulting
from their conviction.4 These financial obligatiwons can include outstanding
court fines, legal fees, and victim restitution.5 These laws have left otherwise
eligible voters, including Ms. Williams, unable to participate in the
democratic process because they owe a monetary debt to the state.6
Although disenfranchising voters over outstanding legal financial
obligations (“LFOs”) is widely criticized, no court has yet been persuaded to
strike down these laws. The practice continues to disenfranchise people
based on wealth, and disproportionately affects the voting rights of people
of color due to inherent racial disparities in socioeconomic status and the
* Associate, Covington & Burling LLP. J.D., 2019, Fordham University School of Law;
B.A., 2012, American University School of Public Affairs. I would like to thank Professor Tracy
Higgins and Julia MacAllister for their helpful criticism and guidance, the editorial staff of the
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their assistance, and my wife, Emily Falcone, for her
patience, love, and support.
1. Connor Sheets, Too Poor to Vote: How Alabama’s ‘New Poll Tax’ Bars Thousands of
People From Voting, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/
oct/04/alabama-voting-poll-tax.
2. Id.
3. Samantha J. Gross, Florida Voters Approve Amendment 4 on Restoring Felons’ Voting
Rights, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/
election/article220678880.html.
4. ALLYSON FREDERICKSEN & LINNEA LASSITER, ALL. FOR A JUST SOC’Y,
DISENFRANCHISED BY DEBT: MILLIONS IMPOVERISHED BY PRISON, BLOCKED FROM VOTING 5
(2016).
5. Erika L. Wood & Neema Trivedi, The Modern Day Poll Tax: How Economic Sanctions
Block Access to the Polls, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 30, 36–38 (2007).
6. Sheets, supra note 1.
[425]
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American criminal justice system. LFO disenfranchisement calls to mind
the poll taxes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which were
prohibited in federal elections by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and in
state elections by the landmark Supreme Court case Harper v. Virginia State
Board of Elections.7 Although the concept of felon disenfranchisement itself
has been affirmatively upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court,8 this Article
argues that disenfranchisement for outstanding LFOs is more akin to the poll
tax jurisprudence than to the felon-voting cases. This Article aims to add to
a growing body of literature criticizing these practices by providing an
extensive examination of the constitutional doctrines and legislative history
of both the practice of LFO disenfranchisement as well as the possibly
implicated constitutional provisions. This Article ultimately argues that
LFO disenfranchisement schemes violate both the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and
rendering a necessary change in the way courts should view this issue.
Part I discusses the history and background of the poll tax and the long
struggle that resulted in its abolishment under both a constitutional
amendment and landmark Supreme Court case. Part II describes the history
and legal doctrines surrounding felon disenfranchisement in the United
States. Part III discusses LFO disenfranchisement and its current treatment
by courts. Finally, Part IV analyzes LFO disenfranchisement in light of the
relevant case law, history, and constitutional text, and concludes that courts
have incorrectly analyzed these restrictions as they violate both the TwentyFourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.

I. The Poll Tax and the Long Struggle to Enfranchise the Poor
The prohibition against poll taxes is part of the written constitution of
the United States as well as the larger constitutional canon. The view that
the poll tax is antithetical to American democracy, however, was far from
self-evident and resulted from a transformative change in the American
constitutional fabric during the New Deal Era and Civil Rights Movement.
Part I.A. addresses the early history and use of the poll tax in America. Part
I.B. addresses the legislative history and jurisprudence surrounding the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment. Part I.C. discusses the post-Amendment
treatment of the poll tax and the Supreme Court’s monumental decision in
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,9 which finally, and
determinatively, prohibited the poll tax in America.

7.
8.
9.

383 U.S. 663 (1966).
See infra Part II.B.
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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A. From a Bridge to a Barrier

A poll tax, also called a head tax, is a direct tax levied on all adults11
which in the United States has been strongly connected to voting rights.12 In
the popular imagination, the poll tax is notoriously connected with
suppressing black voters in the Jim Crow South, and while this is true in
some ways, the history of the tax and its connection with the vote is not as
simple as that.
Ironically, the poll tax requirement for casting a ballot in the United
States was originally employed as a means of expanding, rather than
limiting, the franchise. Following the American Revolution, many states
allowed only property owners to vote; the idea being that owning property
showed an investment in the welfare of the community beyond simply living
in it.13 As a more liberal measure, some states, including Pennsylvania,
Georgia, and South Carolina,14 opted to impose a small tax to substitute for
these property qualifications.15 The tax requirement, although still a means
of keeping certain individuals from voting, originally served to expand
voting rights from only white male property owners to those white men who
could afford to pay the tax.16 As the national economy changed and attitudes
about voting gradually liberalized at the state level, with nearly all states
eventually granting universal white male suffrage, these taxes were all but
eliminated as a prerequisite for voting by the mid-nineteenth century.17
However, after the end of the Civil War and the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, the poll tax requirement experienced a
dramatic resurgence in the South.18
Following the collapse of
10. See Fagan Dickinson, The Poll Tax and Voter Registration, 35 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1038
(1957) (“Ironically, the poll tax, which was originally adopted to extend suffrage, is now sometimes
supported as a means of limiting the voting privilege to the ‘better class of people.’”).
11. For an extensive history of the use of these taxes in the Ancient World, England, and
colonial-era America, see generally, David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v. Democracy: The
Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 29 QUINN. L. REV. 375, 378–82 (2011).
12. BRIAN L. FIFE, REFORMING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN AMERICA: TOWARD MORE
DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19 (Praeger, 2010).
13. Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote, 86 DENV. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2009); Schultz &
Clark, supra note 11, at 382.
14. In many Southern states, white men were “increasingly accumulating wealth, even though
it was not in terms of real property, and demanding the vote.” Ellis, supra note 13, at 1039.
15. FIFE, supra note 12, at 19; J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 63
(Yale Univ. Press, 1974); Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 382.
16. See Ellis, supra note 13, at 1037.
17. Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 385 (“By the time of Andrew Jackson’s Presidential
inauguration in 1829, only two states continued to require a freeholder status for voting.”); see also,
id. at 386 (noting that the poll tax’s “adoption was a democratic reform, and its rejection the same”).
18. This post-Reconstruction tax requirement is particularly ironic as some states, such as
Alabama, first entered the Union in the antebellum period without any tax or property qualifications
whatsoever. Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 385.
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Reconstruction, where the voting protections for newly freed black citizens
were vigorously enforced by the federal government, state governments used
their newfound control to actively stop these newly enfranchised voters from
casting ballots, and made various efforts to effectively re-subjugate these
individuals to their enslaved status.19 After periods marked by statesanctioned violence and intimidation, the southern state governments sought
to disenfranchise black voters by more traditional legal means, beginning in
the 1870s and culminating in the state constitutional conventions of the
1890s and 1900s.20 One part of this myriad of efforts was a renewed push
for a poll tax payment as a precondition for voting. These efforts were
initially successfully opposed by poorer white people, who feared the
requirement would also force them to surrender their ability to vote.21
Despite this resistance, every State in the former Confederacy had enacted a
poll tax statute by 1904.22
The renewed poll tax was only one means of suppressing the black vote
in the South, along with other restrictions like literacy tests and grandfather
clauses, and electoral practices such as the white primary.23 Southern
states also continued to use extralegal means, such as violence, lynching,
threats, and intimidation, to keep the black population from voting.24
Although it is impossible to estimate just how many individuals were
disenfranchised specifically as a result of the poll tax, due to the
confluence of these other similar restrictions,25 there is a consensus
among scholars that the poll tax certainly kept at least some otherwise
eligible voters from casting their ballots.26
Although the explicit purpose of the poll tax requirement was to
disenfranchise the black vote, it is important to address the class politics that
19. For a detailed explanation of ways that state governments rolled back the progress of
Reconstruction and subjugated black citizens, see J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First
Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 27, 27–43 (Chandler
Davidson ed., 1984).
20. See Burton D. Wechsler, Black and White Disenfranchisement: Populism, Race, and
Class, 52 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 23, 30-34 (2002).
21. ELEANOR BONTECOU, THE POLL TAX 10 (1942).
22. KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 63.
23. See Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 386; see generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (Oxford University Press, 3d rev. ed. 1974).
24. R. GRANN LLOYD, WHITE SUPREMACY IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1952); see Chandler
Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 10
(Bernard Goffman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992); see generally, WOODWARD, supra note 23.
25. V.O. KEY JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS 599 (1949) (“The assignment of a weight to one of
these influences—the poll tax—is somewhat like trying to decide what proportion of the score of a
football team can be attributed to the efforts of any one player.”); see also, John Lackey, The Poll
Tax: Its Impact on Racial Suffrage, 54 KY. L.J. 423, 427 (1965) (“Apparently, the Mississippi
Department of Revenue is quite willing for [a black person] to pay his poll tax; there were other
effective ways to keep him from voting.”).
26. See KEY, supra note 25, at 599.
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motivated the requirement as well. After the end of Reconstruction and the
withdrawal of federal troops, the Democratic Party, which at that time was
made up of many former Confederate leaders and wealthy white landowners,
once again dominated southern legislatures.27 The Democratic elite sought
to once again unite white southerners in the face of what they viewed as
tyranny and illegitimate rule by northern Republican carpetbaggers.28 Many
of the policies advanced by these legislatures to expand the South’s industrial
and financial standing and modernize the southern economy, however, ran
counter to the economic interests of poor white farmers.29 These poor
farmers eventually split from the Democratic Party to join the People’s Party
(the Populists), an insurgent political movement motivated by increasing
anxiety among the nation’s farmers over the declining position of small,
independently owned farms and the rise of wage labor.30 Interestingly, the
Populists (and, ironically, even the Democrats of this era)31 often relied on
black voters for assistance at the polls,32 despite many leaders of the
movement exhibiting openly xenophobic and racist views.33 While
outwardly in favor of disenfranchising black voters, many of these poorer
whites fought Democratic disenfranchisement efforts due to fears that they
too would lose their political power and voting rights, and would thus forfeit
their economic interests.34

27. See Nate Cohn, Demise of the Southern Democrat Is Now Nearly Complete, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/upshot/demise-of-the-southern-democrat-isnow-nearly-compete.html; Blain Roberts & Ethan J. Kytle, When the South Was the Most
Progressive Region in America, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2018/01/when-the-south-was-the-most-progressive-region-in-america/550442/.
28. KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 26 (“Everywhere the ruling oligarchy stressed the threat of
[black] domination and of a return to Reconstruction and the consequent necessity of solid support
for the ‘white man’s party.’”); see also, id. at 11–17.
29. BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 11 (“The new leaders of the [Democratic] party, however,
proved to be interested primarily in the industrial and financial expansion of the South.”);
KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 17 (“As upper-class Redeemers cut back government expenditures,
absconded with a good deal of the budgeted public money, prevented mountain whites from
electing their own local officials, and instituted policies strikingly favorable to big Northern-owned
businesses, many whites began to doubt the virtues of Redemption.”).
30. KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 33-34; Joseph Gerteis & Alyssa Goolsby, Nationalism in
America: The Case of the Populist Movement, 34 THEORY AND SOCIETY 197, 205–06 (2005). See
generally, JOHN D. HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARMERS’ ALLIANCE AND
THE PEOPLE’S PARTY (1931).
31. Wechsler, supra note 20, at 28 (noting the “striking contradiction” of the Democrats
“being the sworn party of white supremacy, while simultaneously courting the black vote”).
32. See KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 35–37; Lackey, supra note 25, at 424.
33. Gerteis & Goolsby, supra note 30, at 205 (“[D]espite the largely sincere attempt to build
a political coalition of black and white members, most Southern white Populists remained avowed
racists.”).
34. Id.
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After the national People’s Party supported the populist Democratic
Senator William Jennings Bryan’s presidential campaign in 1896,35 the
People’s Party lost nearly all of its electoral clout, and the Democrats once
again dominated southern legislatures.36 To keep their grip on power, and
despite large protests from poorer and formerly Populist-led counties, many
of the remaining states approved new poll taxes in rapid succession.37 While
the state constitutional conventions of this era were explicit about their
intention to disenfranchise black voters38 without disenfranchising any white
voters, many of these conventions’ debate records show a willingness to
purge formerly Populist white voters as well.39 Both black voters and lowerclass white voters, who had seen their political power and franchise rights
expanded during the years of Populist challenge to the one-party South,
became a prime target for disenfranchisement once the People’s Party all but
collapsed.40 In the fifteen-year period between 1889 and 1904, the former
Confederate states, now firmly dominated by the Democrats, wrote a number
of statutes and constitutional provisions designed to keep these voters from
the polls, and one of the chief means of doing so was the new poll tax
requirement for voting.41
Indeed, even while the poll tax requirement was specifically aimed at
black voters, and generally at all low-income voters, it had the effect of
disproportionately affecting black voters.42 As Senator Paul Douglas of
Illinois later explained, the poll-tax requirement “was intended to reduce the
number of low-income citizens who could vote. It disenfranchised poor
whites as well as poor [black people]. But since the [black people] were on
the average much poorer than the whites, it disenfranchised more [black

35. Although Bryan championed the economic interests of the poorer whites most associated
with populism, throughout his life he held racist views toward African Americans. See HICKS,
supra note 30, at 354–79 (describing the contentious internal debates within the Populist movement
regarding support of Bryan’s campaign); see also, Willard H. Smith, William Jennings Bryan and
Racism, 54 J. NEGRO HISTORY 127, 136 (1969) (“[Bryan’s] attitude toward [black/white] race
relations, however, was much less generous and was quite inconsistent with his emphasis on
democracy, equality, and rule by the people.”).
36. Lackey, supra note 25, at 424.
37. See Franklin B. Williams Jr., The Poll Tax as a Suffrage Requirement in the South, 18701901, 18 J. SOUTHERN HISTORY 469, 471 (1952).
38. See, e.g., ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT 17 (2015) (noting one delegate discussing
the poll tax provision as a means of both raising education funding and disenfranchising black
voters, who he described as “a vicious and useless class”).
39. KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 250–57. In Alabama’s convention, for example, there is
direct testimony that the cumulative tax provision was meant to disenfranchise many poor whites
who would vote against the economic interests of the wealthy Southern Democratic elite. See id at
169; see also, Dickinson, supra note 10, at 1036.
40. Wechsler, supra note 20, at 29.
41. See KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 169–81.
42. See Lackey, supra note 25, at 427.
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people] than whites.” As a means of racially targeted disenfranchisement,
the poll tax was incredibly effective. As an illustrative example: in
Louisiana, there were 130,000 black voters registered in 1896 before the poll
tax requirement was enacted, but only 1,340 remained in 1904.44
Poll taxes in the post-Reconstruction south45 usually ranged from $1.00
to $2.00 per year, which was excessive for both poor black and white
sharecroppers, given that sharecroppers were not typically paid in cash.46
Because the tax was such a relatively small amount, it had the feature of
being “no appreciable hindrance to voting for the well-to-do when its
payment [was] a prerequisite to voting” but created “a serious burden for
those of low economic status.”47 In 1901, one South Carolina congressman
noted that many potential black voters did not bother to register to vote
“because they would rather save the dollar which would be required as poll
tax.”48 Additionally, some states made little or no effort to collect the poll
tax while still requiring payment as a precondition to vote, or specified
specific windows in which to pay the tax that did not coincide with
elections.49 In many states, the taxes accrued over time when they were
unpaid, so the individual would have to pay back taxes for every year they
were unable to pay before they could exercise the right to vote.50 The
effectiveness of the tax can be summarized by a statement by a woman in the
Georgia backcountry when asked about the tax: “A dollar ain’t much if
you’ve got it.”51
B. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment: Ghosts of the New Deal

The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which ultimately
banned the use of the poll tax as a means to disqualify voters in federal

43. Lackey, supra note 25, at 427.
44. Kelly Philips Erb, For Election Day, A History of the Poll Tax in America, FORBES (Nov.
5, 2018, 8:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2018/11/05/just-before-theelections-a-history-of-the-poll-tax-in-america/#508c6f164e44.
45. For an examination of the variations in the poll tax requirements of the individual states,
see FREDERIC D. OGDEN, THE POLL TAX IN THE SOUTH 39–40 (Univ. of Alabama Press, 1958).
46. FIFE, supra note 12, at 19; KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 65.
47. BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 2.
48. KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 63.
49. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 10, at 1032 (noting that Texas’s poll-tax provision
required voters to present a receipt showing that their tax was paid between October 1st and January
31st). Receipt requirements also denied the franchise, as receipts could be lost in between payment
of the tax and the election. Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 389.
50. KOUSSER, supra note 15, at 65; see also, C. VAN WOODWARD, A HISTORY OF THE
SOUTH: 9 ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, 336 (1954); Ellis, supra note 13, at 1042.
51. BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 16; Sarah Wilkerson-Freeman, The Second Battle for
Woman Suffrage: Alabama White Women, the Poll Tax, and V. O. Key’s Master Narrative of
Southern Politics, 68 J. SOUTHERN HISTORY 333, 347 (2002).
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elections, is often referred to as a “forgotten amendment.” Although it is
widely assumed that the amendment was passed as a result of the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1960s, the amendment actually traces its origins
thirty years earlier, to the New Deal era. Part I.B.1 discusses the New Deal
origins of the effort to abolish the poll tax that culminated in the TwentyFourth Amendment, Part I.B.2 discusses the amendment’s legislative
history, and Part I.B.3 discusses the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
amendment as exemplified by Harman v. Forsennius.53
i. New Deal Efforts to Abolish the Poll Tax

In the 1930s, early organizing campaigns sought federal involvement in
abolishing the poll tax, and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”)
initially gave his full-throated support for the abolition, publicly framing the
abolishment of the tax as an issue of class rather than race.54 In this era of
expanding protections for workers’ rights and economic security, many bills
died or were watered down in committees chaired by conservative
Democrats from poll tax states.55 At the time, however, the South had the
largest proportion of self-identifying “liberals,” here meaning supporters of
progressive economic programs,56 than any other region in the country,57 and
the Great Depression had greatly increased the number of white people
affected by the tax requirement.58 The New Dealers hardly cared that these
economic liberals, much like the Populists before them, included vehement
racists. In order to get these programs through Congress, FDR needed the
support of poorer southern whites who were disproportionately
disenfranchised by poll taxes but who had perhaps the greatest economic
stake in the programs’ passage.59
Because of this widespread
52. See Brendan F. Friedman, Note, The Forgotten Amendment and Voter Identification:
How the New Wave of Voter Identification Laws Violates the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 42
HOFSTRA L. REV. 343, 346 (2013); see also, Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the
Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 N.W. U. L. REV. 63, 69 (2009) (“The
Twenty-Fourth Amendment lies deep in the shadows.”); Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 375
(describing the Amendment as one of the “‘great silences’ of the Constitution” and noting its “ironic
superfluousness”).
53. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
54. MANFRED BERG, “THE TICKET TO FREEDOM”: THE NAACP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
BLACK POLITICAL INTEGRATION 105 (2005); Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 71.
55. See generally Louis Menard, How the Deal Went Down, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 24,
2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/04/how-the-deal-went-down.
56. As noted above, many poorer whites in the South were economically liberal but socially
and racially conservative. Paul Krugman referred to these voters in a recent New York Times oped as “racist populists.” Paul Krugman, The Empty Quarters of U.S. Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/opinion/ralph-northam-howard-schultz.html?rref=co
llection%2Fbyline%2Fpaul-krugman.
57. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 71.
58. OGDEN, supra note 45, at 182–85.
59. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 71; Friedman, supra note 52, at 346.
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disenfranchisement, there was a widely held belief that southern
congressional delegations did not reflect the true economic policy
preferences of the region.60
The New Deal era brought legal challenges to the poll tax as well. In
1937, a white man sued over Georgia’s poll tax statute, claiming that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause as well as the Nineteenth Amendment,
as Georgia did not collect the tax from women. In Breedlove v. Suttles, the
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the scheme,
finding it to be a legitimate nondiscriminatory method for raising revenue.61
Ignoring the racist and classist motivations of the poll tax requirement, the
Court instead viewed the tax as a neutral form of taxation which had long
been used in the United States and other countries, equating it to the
antebellum practice.62 The Court noted that:
[T]he payment of poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting is a familiar
and reasonable regulation long enforced in many states and for more
than a century in Georgia. That measure reasonably may be deemed
essential to that form of levy. Imposition without enforcement
would be futile. Power to levy and power to collect are equally
necessary. And, by the exaction of payment before registration, the
right to vote is neither denied nor abridged on account of sex. It is
fanciful to suggest that the Georgia law is a mere disguise under
which to deny or abridge the right of men to vote on account of their
sex.63
The Breedlove decision, along with conservative Southern Democrats
in Congress opposing FDR’s court packing plan, sparked a concerted effort
to prohibit the poll tax by constitutional amendment.64 Although
unsuccessful, debate surrounding the poll tax took up a great deal of political
oxygen during the New Deal period, with many more liberal Democrats
framing the issue of repeal as a class issue, as opposed to a race-based civil
rights issue.65
60. See BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 4 (“[T]he will of the majority of citizens has at times
been thwarted by . . . men who have been chosen by a restricted electorate among whom there is a
very small proportion of the workers in field or factory.”). Roosevelt explicitly blamed the poll tax
for many of his political problems and the inability to pass certain New Deal programs. See STEVEN
F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 57 (Columbia Univ.
Press, 1976) (citing Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, to Aubrey
Williams (Mar. 28, 1938), President’s Personal File 200, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library) (“I
think the South agrees with you and me. One difficulty is that three quarters of the whites in the
South cannot vote–poll tax etc.”).
61. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
62. Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 281; see also, Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 393.
63. Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 281.
64. FIFE, supra note 12, at 19.
65. Friedman, supra note 52, at 346.
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FDR initially used the full weight of the bully pulpit to decry the poll
tax requirement, labeling the more conservative southern leaders of the
Democratic Party as representatives of “Polltaxia,” and openly challenging
these members with more liberal candidates in Democratic primaries.66 As
the Democratic Party was large and ideologically diverse at that time, with
the South essentially being a one-party region, Roosevelt hoped that
challenging the “Polltaxia” contingent would change the party’s
congressional delegation to a more liberal and ideologically coherent
caucus which would reliably back his New Deal initiatives.67 At the same
time, Roosevelt secretly encouraged campaigns to repeal the poll tax at
the state level.68
The conservatives, however, mostly held onto their seats in the
primaries of 1938, and forced the president to retreat on his call for an
abolition of the poll tax.69 While Eleanor Roosevelt vigorously and vocally
supported a full statutory ban on the practice even after this defeat,70 the
President, stung by his rebukes in the southern primaries, remained much
more cautious on the issue throughout the remainder of his presidency.71
Regardless, FDR’s early embrace of the issue paved the way for future
legislators to frame the repeal of the poll tax in terms of wealth
discrimination. This made the abolition of the tax a major priority of liberals
and progressives in the following decades.72
ii. The Long Road to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment

At the end of the New Deal era, anti-poll tax efforts achieved moderate
success in fits and starts. During the Second World War, for example,
Congress passed the Soldier Vote Act of 1942, which forbade states from
levying a poll tax for absentee ballots in federal elections.73 The pressure
to abolish the tax increased further when the Supreme Court struck down

66. Id.
67. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 71 (“Roosevelt’s aim was nothing less than the
transformation of the Democrats into an ideologically coherent liberal party that could sustain
progressive politics on a national basis.”).
68. Id.
69. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 71.
70. ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 191 (1992) (“I
also remember wanting to get all-out support for . . . the removal of the poll tax, but though Franklin
was in favor . . . [it] never became ‘must’ legislation.”). Eleanor Roosevelt remained a vocal
advocate against the poll tax both as First Lady and after she left the White House. THE ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT ENCYCLOPEDIA 92 (Maurine H. Beasley et al., eds., 2001) (discussing Roosevelt’s
collaborative efforts with Pauli Murray to organize the National Committee to Abolish the Poll
Tax); id. at 94 (discussing her efforts to pressure the Truman administration on the issue).
71. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 77–78.
72. Id. at 71; see also, BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 4.
73. Soldier Vote Act, ch. 561, § 2, 56 Stat. 753, 753 (1942).
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74

the “white primary” and the Republican Party placed opposition to the
tax requirement in its 1944 platform.75 It was not until 1946, however, that
the effort to establish what eventually became the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment took hold.
Beginning in 1946, Senator Spessard Holland, a Florida Democrat,
attempted to pass an Article V constitutional amendment to abolish the poll
tax.76 His first proposal passed the House but died by filibuster in the
Senate.77 He would repeat this quixotic effort over the next twelve years,
repeatedly reintroducing the amendment in each new Congress.78 Five years
before the amendment’s eventual passage, it seemed that these efforts would
continue to be fruitless in perpetuity, both due to southern filibuster and the
lack of interest on the part of three-fourths of the states.79
Interestingly, despite the Twenty-Fourth Amendment being his
signature achievement, Holland was a lifelong segregationist.80 Holland
continually agitated for the amendment because he viewed the issue through
the New Deal-era lens of class, rather than race, as he repeatedly stressed
throughout the decades of debates on the issue.81 Although the poll tax was
certainly a large piece of the Jim Crow recipe for disenfranchising black
voters, other means, such as literacy tests, were likely far more essential
ingredients for black disenfranchisement.82 In fact, by the time the
amendment came before the states, all but five states had eliminated the
practice entirely, largely due to the slow, piecemeal efforts of the New Dealera reformers.83
Holland’s efforts were rewarded, however, in the early days of the
Kennedy administration.84 With national public opinion slowly turning
against Jim Crow in 1962, Holland’s amendment was attractive to a number
74. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see also, Michael J. Klarman, The White
Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 55 (2014) (describing Smith v. Allwright as “[t]he Court’s most important white
primary decision”).
75. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 78.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 78–79.
79. Dickinson, supra note 10, at 1038.
80. See Associated Press, Spessard L. Holland Dies at 79; Former Senator From Florida,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/11/07/archives/spessard-l-hollanddies-at-79-former-senator-from-florida.html.
81. 108 CONG. REC. 2851, 4154 (statement of Senator Holland) (“[T]he proposal does not
come under the ordinary classification of the ordinary civil rights legislation. It applies to
majorities, to minorities, and to every person of every color.”).
82. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 79.
83. Id.
84. When John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960, fewer than 30 percent of all 1.4 million
Southern blacks were eligible to cast a ballot. See MARK R. LEVY & MICHAEL S. KRAMER, THE
ETHNIC FACTOR 50–53 (Simon and Schuster, 1972).
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of constituencies. Some southerners in Congress felt that they could abolish
the poll tax without changing the political reality of the region, and that
coming out in favor of the amendment would give them cover to oppose
more sweeping civil rights reforms.85 Desperate to contain the political
fallout from the Freedom Rides,86 President Kennedy was anxious for an
easy civil rights win that would not damage his reputation among white
southerners, who might provide the difference in his 1964 reelection effort.87
Although the amendment faced strong opposition from some prominent
liberals and civil rights groups because of fears of setting a precedent
requiring all civil rights issues to be passed by constitutional amendment, the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment ultimately passed Congress by incredible
margins,88 almost thirty years after FDR’s initial campaign against
“Polltaxia.”
After passage in Congress, the amendment was quickly ratified by the
states over the next sixteen months, propelled by the rising national interest
in the civil rights movement.89 Remarkably, the struggle to abolish the tax
over the decades “had suddenly become a relatively uncontroversial—if
painfully inadequate—response to the country’s racial and economic
problems.”90 The text of the amendment, now enshrined in the written
constitution, provides that:
[T]he right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or
other election for President or Vice President, for electors for
President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in

85. See Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 85–86 (“One of the strong factors in the poll tax
amendment against which you seem to have a bad aversion but which has allowed many Senators
to cast a Constitutional vote on a relatively non-important matter which gave them an out on vastly
more important matters like the literacy bill.” (quoting Letter from Spessard L. Holland to E. H.
Crowson (May 12, 1962))).
86. See generally RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (Oxford Univ. Press, 2007).
87. The Amendment was opposed by a number of more liberal senators in both parties, as
well as civil rights groups such as the NAACP, as they thought that a constitutional amendment
would force a precedent that future civil rights laws could only be passed through constitutional
amendment, which would allow thirteen states to veto them. See After the Poll Tax, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Mar. 31, 1962, at 12; Anthony Lewis, Senate Approves Ban on Poll Tax in Federal Votes,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1962), at A1.
88. The vote tally for final passage was 77 to 16 in the Senate, and 294 to 86 in the House.
108 CONG. REC. 2851, 17,670 (1962); The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 1962 CONG. Q. ALMANAC
404. Although the final passage was by overwhelming margins, moving the amendment through
Congress was by no means easy. For a complete and well-written history of the difficult legislative
and procedural maneuvers involved in passing the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, see Ackerman &
Nou, supra note 52, at 85–86.
89. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 87.
90. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 87.
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Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.91
Furthermore, “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.”92
iii. The Supreme Court Weighs In

At the time of the amendment’s ratification, only five states still had a
poll-tax qualification on the books.93 As the amendment concerned only
federal elections, four states retained their tax requirement for state elections,
thereby attempting to set up two separate sets of voting qualifications.94
Indeed, Joe Patterson, the Mississippi Attorney General at the time of the
amendment’s ratification, stated that “[s]ome machinery will have to be set
up to reckon with two sets of voters—one for state elections and one for
national elections,” and Alabama’s Attorney General, Richmond Flowers,
lamented the “terrifically confusing” situation caused by the amendment’s
passage.95
The Virginia Legislature, anticipating the enactment of the amendment,
had previously passed a law to ensure that its poll tax would be retained in
state elections.96 The law permitted residents to vote for federal candidates
by filing certificates of residence, but required annual payments of $1.50 a
person for voting in state elections.97 In Harman v. Forsennius, the only case
in history where the Supreme Court directly applied and interpreted the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, this practice was ultimately struck down.98 In
holding that this dual system was “repugnant to the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment,” the Harman Court framed its understanding of the poll tax in
both racial and economic terms.99
The Court noted the “widespread national concern” with the poll tax in
the lead up to the amendment’s passage, and described the “general
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 2.
93. These states were Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia. Ben A. Franklin,
Impact of Poll Tax Has Waned in Last 40 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 1964), https://www.nytimes
.com/1964/01/24/archives/impact-of-poll-tax-has-waned-in-last-40-years.html.
94. United Press Int’l, 24th Amendment, Banning Poll Tax, Has Been Ratified; Vote in South
Dakota Senate Completes the Process of Adding to Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 1964),
https://www.nytimes.com/1964/01/24/archives/24th-amendment-banning-poll-tax-has-been-ratifi
ed-vote-in-south.html. Arkansas repealed its tax requirement for state elections by ballot initiative
in 1964. ARK. SEC’Y OF STATE, HISTORICAL INITIATIVES & REFERENDA ELECTION RESULTS
(1938-2018) at 10, https://www.sos.arkansas.gov/uploads/elections/Initiatives_and_Amendment
s_1938-2018_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).
95. See United Press Int’l, supra note 94.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
99. Id. at 533–34.
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repugnance to the disenfranchisement of the poor occasioned by failure to
pay the tax,” due to its nature of “exact[ing] a price for the privilege of
exercising the franchise.”100 The majority opinion also observed that the poll
tax was “a requirement adopted with an eye to the disenfranchisement of
[black people] and applied in a discriminatory manner.”101
Crucially, the Court began its analysis of the Virginia alternative to
the poll tax by opining that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment “does not
merely insure that the franchise shall not be ‘denied’ by reason of failure
to pay the poll tax; it expressly guarantees that the right to vote shall not
be ‘denied or abridged’ for that reason.”102 Comparing the new provision
to the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court declared that the Twenty-Fourth
“‘nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes’ of impairing the
right guaranteed.”103
Thus, according to the Court, in order for the plaintiffs to demonstrate
that the restriction was unconstitutional under the amendment, they needed
to show that it “impose[d] a material requirement solely upon those who
refuse to surrender their constitutional right to vote in federal elections
without paying a poll tax.”104 The Court noted that the Virginia scheme was
a “cumbersome procedure” that imposed a “real obstacle” for those citizens
who asserted their constitutional right to vote free of a poll tax
requirement.105 A State imposing a requirement upon voters who refused to
pay the poll tax therefore abridged voting rights because of the refusal to pay
the poll tax.106
The Court gave no credence to the argument that the new dual scheme
provided administrative benefits to the state, concluding that in federal
elections “the poll tax is abolished absolutely as a prerequisite to voting, and
no equivalent or milder substitute may be imposed.”107 In sweeping terms,
the Court declared that “[a]ny material requirement imposed upon the federal
voter solely because of his refusal to waive the constitutional immunity
subverts the effectiveness of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and must fall
under its ban.”108 The amendment, the Court proclaimed, “was . . . designed
to absolve all requirements impairing the right to vote in federal elections by
reason of failure to pay the poll tax.”109

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 539.
Harman, 380 U.S. at 540.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 540–41 (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
Harman, 380 U.S. at 542. (emphasis added).
Id.
Harman, 380 U.S. at 542.
Id. at 544.
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Despite the bold pronouncements of the Harman decision, the TwentyFourth Amendment was never successfully used again to challenge the
constitutionality of a state statute.110 The legislative follow-up to the
amendment in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the seminal case of Harper
v. Virginia State Board of Elections111 helped ensure, however, that the
prohibition of the poll tax requirement for the exercise of the franchise
became a bedrock principle of the constitutional canon.
C. The Death of the Poll Tax: The Voting Rights Act and Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections

Although the Twenty-Fourth Amendment prevents states from
conditioning voting on payment of the poll tax in federal elections, the states
initially remained free to use the tax as a barrier in their state elections.
While only four states retained the poll tax in the early 1960s, the Civil
Rights Movement continued to press the national conversation in favor of
civil and voting rights, including the absolute abolition of the tax requirement
at the state level.
That opportunity seemingly came with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
The monumental legislation passed through Congress in the wake of
“Bloody Sunday” and Martin Luther King Jr.’s march from Selma to
Montgomery, Alabama, which turned a spotlight on the disenfranchisement
of black voters in the South.112 The footage of King and other organizers
like later Congressman John Lewis being brutally beaten on the Edmund
Pettus Bridge stirred a nationwide call to action to protect the right to vote.113
Although scholarly114 and popular media115 have explored the Act’s
passage through Congress and the ways it has fundamentally affected
voting rights and entered the national consensus, less attention has been
given to the unique way in which the Act addressed the question of the poll
tax in state elections.
Instead of including an outright statutory ban on the practice in the final
text of the Act, Congress instead engaged in a novel kind of “legal ju-jitsu”
by issuing a list of “findings” that declared that the poll tax denies or abridges
the constitutional right to vote. Congress then directed the Attorney General
to file a lawsuit urging the Supreme Court to strike down the remaining state
110.
111.
112.

Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 376.
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
BERMAN, supra note 38, at 4–6; DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 404 (1986).
113. GARROW, supra note 112, at 404.
114. See, e.g., Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 87–111. See generally, THE FUTURE OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (David L. Epstein, et al. eds., 2006); Davidson, supra note 24.
115. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 38, at 13–64; ALL THE WAY (HBO Films 2016); SELMA
(Paramount Pictures 2014).
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116

poll tax requirements. The provision’s authors hoped that this approach
would encode the elimination of the poll tax as a “superprecedent”
through interbranch collaboration between Congress and the courts.117
Rather than using the cumbersome and politically costly process of an
Article V amendment, the Voting Rights Act’s sponsors hoped to
collaborate with the judiciary to “crystalize commitments rooted in two
generations of constitutional politics,” as exemplified by the public
mobilization and legislative actions accompanying the New Deal and the
Civil Rights Movement.118 As Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach
explained to President Lyndon Johnson, involving both Congress and the
courts in the effort was the “safest, swiftest, and most efficient course to
eliminate the poll tax.”119
The Supreme Court ultimately took up the issue in the 1966 case Harper
v. Virginia State Board of Elections,120 holding that Virginia’s state poll tax
scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause. Writing for the six-justice
majority, Justice William O. Douglas reversed the Court’s decision in
Breedlove. Interestingly, Douglas’s majority opinion made no mention of
the tax’s purpose of disenfranchising black voters,121 and instead framed the
issue as the state discriminating on the basis of wealth.122 The Court noted
that although states have the right to regulate their own elections, these
regulations must not “invidiously discriminate” and must be within the
confines of the Equal Protection Clause.123 Speaking in the Warren Court’s
trademark broad terms, the Court declared that states violate the Equal
Protection Clause “whenever [they] make[] the affluence of the voter or
payment of any fee an electoral standard.”124 Citing to the Court’s earlier
voting rights jurisprudence, Douglas noted that the “political franchise of
voting” is a “fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all

116. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 101, 109.
117. Id. at 103–04.
118. Id at 109.
119. Memorandum from Att’y Gen’l Nicholas B. Katzenbach to Lyndon B. Johnson, President
of the United States, Reasons Why the Department of Justice Has Favored the Mansfield-Dirksen
Approach to Elimination of the Poll Tax (May 21, 1965); see also, Ackerman & Nou, supra note
52, at 101-02. The approach was not without its detractors—it was opposed by both liberals such
as Ted Kennedy and Jacob Javits as well as segregationists like Strom Thurmond. Id at 101–04.
120. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
121. See id. at 672 (Black, J., dissenting) (“It should be pointed out at once that the Court’s
decision is to no extent based on a finding that the Virginia law . . . is being used as a device or
mechanism to deny [black] citizens of Virginia the right to vote on account of their color.”).
122. Id. at 666 (majority opinion).
123. Id. at 666; see also, id. at 665 (“[T]he right of suffrage ‘is subject to the imposition of
state standards which are not discriminatory.’” (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board,
360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)).
124. 383 U.S. at 666.
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125

rights.” As an illustration, the Court compared the poll tax requirement to
a hypothetical tax on the right to speak, noting that while “no court would
hesitate to strike it down as a blatant infringement of the freedom of speech,”
“the poll tax as enforced . . . is a tax on the equally important right to vote.”126
Douglas’s opinion contains many broad, sweeping declarations about
the unacceptability of limiting exercise of the franchise by discriminating in
favor of wealth. The opinion declared that wealth, like race, has no bearing
on one’s ability to be an informed voter,127 and that “a citizen, a qualified
voter, is no more nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm.”128
Douglas called this “the clear and strong command of our Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause.”129 He noted that “[t]he principle that denies the
State the right to dilute a citizen’s vote on account of his economic status or
other such factors, by analogy, bars a system which excludes those unable to
pay a fee to vote or who fail to pay.”130
Douglas also found fault with Virginia’s argument that the poll tax
was more akin to an administrative fee in other state functions, like
licensing drivers, which is applied equally to all citizens. The Court stated
that “the interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the
power to fix qualifications.”131 In comparing voting qualifications drawn
on the basis of wealth to lines and practices drawn on the basis of race,
Douglas opined that “[t]o introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure
of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant
factor.”132 The Court held that the degree of discrimination caused by the
fee was irrelevant. The fee itself as a prerequisite for voting “r[an] afoul
of the Equal Protection Clause.”133 The Equal Protection Clause, the Court
noted, requires “the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the
election of state legislators.”134
In overruling Breedlove, the Court noted that “the Equal Protection
Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era” and that, in
determining what constitutes a discriminatory practice, the Court has “never
been confined to historic notions of equality” because “[n]otions of what
constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do

125. Harper, 383 U.S. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
126. Id. at 665 n. 2 (quoting United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 254 (W.D. Tex. 1966)).
127. Id. at 668 (“Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate
intelligently in the electoral process.”).
128. Id. at 667.
129. Id.
130. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 670 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)).
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135

change.”
The Court then compared the attitude around the poll tax
requirement to the Court’s evolution on the concept of “separate but equal”
between Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education.136 In
reversing the lower court and declaring the poll tax requirement
unconstitutional, Justice Douglas forcefully concluded: “wealth or fee
paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote
is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.”137
Harper is in keeping with many other Warren Court cases that found
government distinctions based on wealth constitutionally deficient.138
Although the Burger Court began to shift away from the bold
pronouncements in Harper, holding that wealth is not a suspect class on par
with race and applying the rational basis test to cases alleging wealth
discrimination,139 Harper remains a landmark case in the constitutional
canon. Despite the ideological shift of the Court over time, it continues to
cite Harper,140 and it will still apply strict scrutiny to cases involving wealth
discrimination when a fundamental right, such as voting, is implicated.141
Although Justice Douglas’s opinion fails even to mention the TwentyFourth Amendment or the constitutional “findings” of the Voting Rights Act
on the poll tax, Bruce Ackerman and Jennifer Nou posit that Harper deserves
status as a superprecedent, similar to notable New Deal era cases such as
United States v. Darby Lumber Company.142 In these cases, the Court uses
its power to uphold landmark statutes and cement the American people’s
popular sovereignty into the country’s larger constitutional canon.143 Harper
stands for the notion that the American people, rather than simply the six

135. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669.
136. Id. at 669–70 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 536 (1896)).
137. Id. at 670.
138. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating filing fees for divorce
cases as applied to individuals unable to pay the fee); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(holding that welfare beneficiaries possess a property right in their anticipated government benefits,
and that such benefits cannot be terminated without a hearing); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (requiring states to provide legal counsel to indigent criminal defendants); see also,
MICHAEL DIMINO ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 42 (2d ed. 2015).
139. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973); see also, Bertrall L. Ross II, Measuring Political Power: Suspect
Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 341–43 (2016).
140. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003); Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 105 (2000).
141. DIMINO ET AL., supra note 138, at 43.
142. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
143. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 136. For an extensive explanation of why these and
other New Deal-era statutes and precedents should be given this special status as part of the “small
c” constitutional fabric of the United States, see Luke Norris, The Workers’ Constitution, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1459, 1500–14 (2019).
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justices in the majority, had ultimately rejected qualifying the right to vote
on the basis of wealth once and for all.

II. Civil Death: Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States
To understand the connection between the poll tax and
disenfranchisement for the failure to pay legal financial obligations, it is
essential to explore the practice of felon disenfranchisement in the United
States. Part II.A. discusses the history of felon disenfranchisement in the
United States. Part II.B. discusses the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence
surrounding the issue.
A. The Origins of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States

Unlike nearly every other western democracy, the United States forces
inordinate civil penalties on people convicted of felonies, as opposed to
criminal punishment alone. These consequences often include fines, victim
restitution, the loss of the right to serve on juries, and, crucially, the loss of
the right to vote.144 In the 2000 election, approximately 4.7 million otherwise
eligible Americans were prohibited from voting because they were
incarcerated due to a criminal conviction, were serving terms of probation or
parole, had previous criminal convictions, or had unpaid fees or court costs
that were imposed on them as a condition of their conviction.145
The disenfranchisement of felons has its roots in the Middle Ages
concept of “civil death,” where individuals convicted of certain crimes were
banished from the community and lost all legal rights, including their right
to own and inherit property.146 This concept was brought to the United States
by European colonists, although the colonists eventually abandoned
stripping certain civil rights such as inheritance.147 In the early United States,
only certain crimes were subject to disenfranchisement laws, but by the mid-

144. See Lauren Handelsman, Note, Giving the Barking Dog Bite: Challenging Felon
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875, 1879 (2005);
Carlos M. Portugal, Comment, Democracy Frozen in Devonian Amber: The Racial Impact of
Permanent Felon Disenfranchisement in Florida, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2003).
145. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of
Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 780, 797 (2002).
146. Harry David Saunders, Civil Death – A New Look at an Ancient Doctrine, 11 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 988, 988-992 (1970); see also Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological
Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1060;
Mark Haase, Civil Death in Modern Times: Reconsidering Felony Disenfranchisement in
Minnesota, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1913, 1913 (2015); Handelsman, supra note 144, at 1879.
147. Handelsman, supra note 144, at 1879.
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nineteenth century several states prohibited felons who had committed
serious crimes from casting a ballot.148
Although the practice had roots in the Early Republic, felon
disenfranchisement, like the poll tax, was openly weaponized against newly
enfranchised black voters during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In many post-Reconstruction constitutions, states expanded the
limits of provisions revoking voting rights, by enumerating specific crimes
they expected black people would be more likely to commit.149 Between
1865 and 1900, eighteen states adopted laws restricting the voting rights of
convicted criminals; thirty-eight states total had some type of felon voting
restriction.150 For example, Alabama’s Constitutional Convention of 1901
included the notes supporting proposed felon disenfranchisement provisions
of delegate John B. Knox, stating that, “The Convention’s goal is to establish
white supremacy in the State, within the limits imposed by the Federal
Constitution,”151 illustrating the “ardent and persistent embrace by Southern
racists of the criminal justice system as a means of racial domination.”152
Today, states with higher numbers of black residents and a high proportion
of non-white prison inmates are the states most likely to have strict criminal
disenfranchisement laws.153
These restrictive laws cast a wide net, and in some extreme cases,
citizens may lose their right to vote for convictions of minor offenses, such
as misdemeanors and felonies that do not even carry a prison term.154 Firsttime offenders may even be disenfranchised after entering guilty pleas for
minor felonies, an action that takes place frequently despite actual innocence
as the offender cannot risk a much harsher sentence if they lose at trial.155
148. Angela Behrens, et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”:
Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC.
559, 563 (2003); Handelsman, supra note 144, at 1879.
149. See FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 4, at 10; Wood & Trivedi, supra note
5, at 31.
150. Wood & Trivedi, supra note 5, at 32.
151. Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Alabama, May 21
to Sept. 3 (1901) (statement of Delegate John B. Knox concerning convict disenfranchisement
provisions).
152. Garrett Epps, The ‘Slave Power’ Behind Florida’s Felon Disenfranchisement, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/the-slave-powerbehind-floridas-felon-disenfranchisement/552269/.
153. FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 4, at 10; Behrens, et al., supra note 148, at
594, 596.
154. FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 4.
155. See generally Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005); Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-isirrelevant/534171/; Dylan Walsh, Why U.S. Criminal Courts Are So Dependent on Plea
Bargaining, THE ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05
/plea-bargaining-courts-prosecutors/524112/; Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed
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Unsurprisingly, like many other practices in the criminal justice
system,156 felon disenfranchisement laws have a racially discriminatory
effect even if the law is facially neutral. It is well established that people of
color are disproportionately arrested and criminally convicted. Although the
gap has closed slightly in recent years, according to a report from the Pew
Research Center, black men are still more than five times as likely as white
men to be incarcerated in the United States.157
If the goal of felon disenfranchisement was to prevent black people
from voting, the laws have been incredibly effective, especially as mass
incarceration greatly increased during the “tough on crime” era of the 1980s
and 1990s.158 The number of black prisoners rose 68 percent between 1980
and 1985, and then more than doubled by 1995.159 Data from the U.S.
Department of Justice shows that 8.3 percent of all black males, ages 25 to
29 in the United States, were in prison in 1996, as opposed to 2.6 percent of
Hispanic males and just 0.8 percent of white males in the same age range.160
While the rates of prison growth have slowed since the 1990s, the carceral
state continues to have profound disproportional impact on the black and
Latino communities. Indeed, “more African Americans are under
correctional control today—in prisons or jail, on probation or parole—than
American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/
nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closed-doors.html.
156. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 185–220 (rev. ed. 2012)
(describing the disproportionate effects of mass incarceration on communities of color and
specifically black men); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN 45-50 (2017) (exploring possible causes of
racial disparities in state prisons); Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of
Minority Communities, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 57 (2014) (describing the Terry stop-and-frisk
doctrine as “a central site of inequality, discrimination, and abuse of power”); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
243, 244 (2015) (describing “the salience of race to the American practice of capital punishment”);
Praatika Prasad, Note, Implicit Racial Biases in Prosecutorial Summations: Proposing an
Integrated Response, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091, 3092–3109 (2018) (discussing racial bias in
prosecutors’ closing statements in criminal cases).
157. John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison Is
Shrinking, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/
01/12/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-in-prison/ (“In 2016, there were 1,608
black prisoners for every 100,000 black adults—more than five times the imprisonment rate for
whites (274 per 100,000) and nearly double the rate for Hispanics (856 per 100,000).”).
158. See generally Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough
on Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3 (2013).
159. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1925-85,
4 (1986) (noting 150,249 black prisoners in state and federal prisons in 1980), with CHRISTOPHER
J. MUMOA & ALLEN J. BECK, PRISONERS IN 1996, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 9 (1997)
(showing 220,700 black prisoners in state and federal prisons in 1985, and 541,900 black prisoners
in that same category of facilities in 1995).
160. DARRELL K. GILLIARD & ALLEN J. BECK, PRISONERS IN 1997, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS 11 (1998).
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were enslaved in 1850,” and, as a result, “more [black men] are
disenfranchised today than in 1870, the year the Fifteenth Amendment was
ratified.”161 One scholar has observed that criminal offenders, who are
disproportionately black, constitute “for the first time since slavery, a
voteless caste” in the United States.162
Unsurprisingly, felon disenfranchisement laws have had profound
effects on the American political landscape, including the very fundamental
methods of how our country’s political maps are drafted. In the census
conducted every decade, incarcerated individuals are typically counted as
residents of the county where the prison is located.163 This artificially
overinflates the population of these counties, which are overwhelmingly
rural, white, and conservative, and leaves the areas where these individuals
are from, which are often urban, diverse, and Democratic leaning, vastly
undercounted.164 The disparity in the population data results in these white
rural areas having more voting representation and political power in the
legislative process at both the state and national level.165
Additionally, the practice of felon disenfranchisement is impactful
enough to have likely made the difference in at least one presidential
election. In 2000, for example, the Florida Secretary of State under
Governor Jeb Bush, Katherine Harris, sent the state’s county election
supervisors a list of 58,000 voters to “purge” from the voting rolls due to a
felony conviction.166 Black Americans made up 11 percent of registered
voters in Florida but 44 percent of voters on the list. After the election, as a
part of a settlement in a lawsuit against Florida by the NAACP, a data firm
estimated that 12,000 voters who were disenfranchised during the election
were mistakenly placed on the list.167 If 44 percent of these voters were
African American, and 90 percent of African American voters voted for Al
Gore, then at least 4,752 black Gore voters were mistakenly disenfranchised,
almost nine times George W. Bush’s margin of victory of 537 votes.168

161. ALEXANDER, supra note 156, at 175.
162. J. Whyatt Modesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP.
POL. & C.R. L. REV. 435, 436 (2001).
163. Julie A. Ebenstein, The Geography of Mass Incarceration: Prison Gerrymandering and
the Dilution of Prisoners’ Political Representation, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323, 325 (2018).
164. Id. at 328–29
165. Id.
166. Ari Berman, How the 2000 Election in Florida Led to a New Wave of Voter
Disenfranchisement, THE NATION (July 28, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the2000-election-in-florida-led-to-a-new-wave-of-voter-disenfranchisement/.
167. Berman, supra note 166.
168. Id.; see also, DIMINO ET AL., supra note 138, at 52.
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B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence – Richardson v. Ramirez and Hunter v.
Underwood

Despite the obvious discriminatory intent and impact of felon
disenfranchisement laws, the Supreme Court has given its explicit blessing
of these laws’ constitutionality. In the 1974 case Richardson v. Ramirez,169
then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist, writing for a six-justice majority,
held that the Fourteenth Amendment grants an “affirmative sanction” to state
laws that disenfranchise individuals with a criminal record.170 Three
plaintiffs challenged a California constitutional provision which completely
denied voting rights to all individuals convicted of an “infamous crime,”
even if they had served their sentence.171 The plaintiffs, all of whom had
successfully completed their parole, claimed that this provision of the
California Constitution and its enabling statute denied them equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.172
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion denied the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim
and declined to apply strict scrutiny, as the Court had applied in other voting
rights cases, based on the majority’s understanding of the language in
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.173 Section 2, which allowed states
to have their apportionment of representatives reduced if they denied the
right to vote to qualified citizens, specifically exempted state efforts to
disenfranchise individuals who “participat[e] in rebellion” or commit some
“other crime.”174 Justice Rehnquist referred to the time of the amendment’s
drafting and ratification to note that the “other crimes” language was never
altered, and that at the time of the amendment’s ratification, “29 states had
provisions in their constitutions which prohibited, or authorized the
legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise by persons convicted of
felonies or infamous crimes.”175 The Court also observed that after the Civil
War, Congress readmitted the former Confederate States with acts that
enabled a “fundamental condition”176 of prohibiting states from depriving
citizens of the right to vote “except as a punishment for such crimes as are
now felonies at common law.”177 Justice Rehnquist opined that, “[T]he
exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in [section] 2

169. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
170. Id. at 54.
171. Id. at 26–27.
172. Id. at 27.
173. See id. at 42, 53–54.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
175. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 48.
176. Id. at 52.
177. Id. at 51; see also, id. at 48–52.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, a sanction which was not present in the case
of . . . other restrictions on the franchise.”178
This “affirmative sanction” of felon disenfranchisement in the
amendment’s plain language, as well as the historical evidence, was of
“controlling significance” to the Court in “distinguishing such laws from
other state limitations on the franchise which have been held invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause.”179
Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice William Brennan,
dissented, deriding the Court’s “unsound historical analysis”180 and stating
that felon disenfranchisement was “not forever immunized from the evolving
standards of equal protection scrutiny.”181
Justice Marshall would have applied strict scrutiny to the California law
since the right to vote is fundamental.182 He noted that there was “no basis
for asserting that ex-felons have any less interest in the democratic process
than any other citizen.”183 Although he did not touch on the racially
discriminatory nature of felon disenfranchisement laws, Justice Marshall
derided the laws as a state attempt to restrict access to the ballot to those who
“support . . . the established order.” In response to the state argument that
disenfranchising felons prevents individuals from selfishly seeking to
undermine the state’s penal values at the ballot box, Justice Marshall
dismissed this argument as merely a “temporal majority” disenfranchising
individuals with different views.184 Because the law is in need of constant
revision in response to society’s changing needs, Justice Marshall felt that
the state effort to disenfranchise felons who might favor change to
society’s criminal laws “strikes at the very heart of the democratic
process,”185 and that felon disenfranchisement was a relic of “the fogs and
fictions of feudal jurisprudence” which “infring[es] upon the spirit of our
system of government.”186
More than a decade later, the Court took on another case concerning
felon disenfranchisement. Justice Rehnquist again delivered the opinion in
Hunter v. Underwood.187 The plaintiffs in Hunter, a black woman and a
white man, challenged the constitutionality of the provision of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901 that disenfranchised all persons convicted of “any

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54–55.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 56 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 78.
Id. at 82–83.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 86 (quoting Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 731 (1914)).
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
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188

crime . . . involving moral turpitude.” While the provision was by its plain
language “racially neutral,” it had an undeniably discriminatory impact on
black individuals.189 The Court then followed the approach of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Redevelopment Corp.190 to determine
whether the law rose to the level of violating the Equal Protection Clause:
“[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results
in a racially disproportionate impact . . . . Proof of racially discriminatory
purpose or intent is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.”191 To violate the Equal Protection Clause, racial discrimination
must have been a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind a law’s
enactment, thus shifting the burden to the state to show that the law would
have been enacted even without the discriminatory intent.192
Citing to the legislative history of the 1901 constitution as well as the
historical record of the time,193 the Hunter Court found that the section of the
Alabama Constitution was enacted with the explicit intent of
disenfranchising black voters and “certainly would not have been adopted
by the convention or ratified by the electorate in the absence of the racially
discriminatory motivation.”194 Although the state contended that the true
purpose of the provision was to disenfranchise poor whites as well as black
voters, the Court, without weighing the question of whether this
discrimination against poor whites was a “permissible motive,” found that
this would not negate the racially discriminatory motive of the Alabama
convention.195 Furthermore, the Court stated, the intervening eighty years
had not legitimated a provision enacted with explicit racially discriminatory
intent.196 Declining to say whether the language would be constitutionally
valid if enacted today, the Court held that the provision violated the Equal
Protection Clause.197
Justice Rehnquist concluded Hunter by attempting to reconcile the case
with his Richardson opinion, stating that Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment certainly “was not designed to permit the purposeful racial
discrimination attending the enactment and operation of [a provision] which

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
(1977)).
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223–24 (quoting ALA. CONST. OF 1901 § 182).
Id. at 227.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Id. at 264–65 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
Id. at 228–31.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 232–33.
Id. at 233.
Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223.
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otherwise violates section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment” and holding that
nothing in Richardson indicated anything to the contrary.198
The practical effect of Richardson and Hunter is that felon
disenfranchisement laws are expressly permitted under the Fourteenth
Amendment and, unlike other restrictions on voting rights, they are beyond
the reach of strict scrutiny so long as they are not expressly enacted at least
in part with a racially discriminatory purpose.199
Although it is nearly impossible to challenge a felon
disenfranchisement law on equal protection grounds, attitudes toward these
laws have changed significantly in both state legislatures and the public at
large within the last decade. It has become increasingly apparent that many
states now see these laws as “a heritage of the old slave-power mindset, [that]
have no business marring politics in a twenty-first century democracy.”200
Since the Richardson and Hunter decisions, many states have loosened
their felon disenfranchisement laws. In Maine and Vermont, those convicted
of a felony are still allowed to vote even while incarcerated.201 It appears
that the tide in some states have turned against felon disenfranchisement,
often in newsworthy ways. For example, in three states where the legislative
process has moved relatively slowly, governors have acted unilaterally to
restore voting rights to certain classes of individuals with felony
convictions.202 Newly elected Governor Andy Beshear recently signed an
executive order restoring voting rights to more than 140,000 formerly
incarcerated individuals in Kentucky.203 Similarly, in 2016, Virginia
Governor Terry McAuliffe issued an executive order restoring the voting
rights of all people with felonies who had completed their parole.204 Lastly,
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo issued an executive order in 2018
indicating his office would consider pardons to restore voting rights for

198. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223.
199. See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218–27 (11th Cir. 2005); Madison
v. State, 163 P.3d 757 (Wash. 2007); Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000); see also,
Sloan G. Speck, Note, “Failure to Pay Any Poll Tax or Other Tax”: The Constitutionality of Tax
Felon Disenfranchisement, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1549, 1556 (2007).
200. Epps, supra note 152.
201. DIMINO ET AL., supra note 138, at 51.
202. See NAT’L. CONF. STATE LEGIS, Felon Voting Rights: Recent State Action, (Oct. 14,
2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx.
203. Arian Campo-Flores, Kentucky’s New Governor Restores Voting Rights to Nonviolent
Felons, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kentuckys-newgovernor-plans-to-restore-voting-rights-to-nonviolent-felons-11576152000.
204. Van R. Newkirk II, How Letting Felons Vote Is Changing Virginia, THE ATLANTIC (Jan.
8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/virginia-clemency-restoration-ofrights-campaigns/549830/.
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individuals on parole, which could allow 35,000 formerly incarcerated
people to get their voting rights back.205
Florida recently overturned its policy of total felon disenfranchisement
via ballot initiative during the 2018 midterm elections, after decades of being
the largest state to disenfranchise citizens with felony convictions.206 Before
the change in the law, 27 percent of all disenfranchised felons in the United
States lived in Florida, and in 2016, more than 10 percent of all the state’s
eligible voting-age population was disenfranchised due to felony
convictions.207 Staggeringly, more than one-fifth of all black eligible voters
in Florida were disenfranchised in 2016.208 The result direct result of this
ballot initiative could be monumental, as Florida frequently plays a key role
in national politics and presidential elections.
While the successful Florida ballot initiative represents an incredible
new opportunity for formerly incarcerated individuals to regain their voting
rights, the Republican-controlled Florida legislature moved in early 2019 to
mandate that these individuals must pay all of their outstanding legal
financial obligations in order to qualify to have their voting rights restored.209
This restriction, signed into law by Governor Ron DeSantis and recently
upheld by the Florida Supreme Court, is estimated to halt or permanently
obstruct the re-enfranchisement of many of the more than half-a-million
people who will be affected by the LFO-repayment measure.210 The next
part addresses these types of LFO restrictions in detail, along with their
unique constitutional and sociological implications.
205. Vivian Wang, Cuomo Plans to Restore Voting Rights to Paroled Felons, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/nyregion/felons-pardon-voting-rights-cuo
mo.html.
206. Gross, supra note 3.
207. Epps, supra note 152.
208. Id.
209. News Serv. of Fla., Amendment 4 Bill: DeSantis Says He’s Ready to Sign, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (May 8, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/05/08/amendment-4bill-desantis-says-hes-ready-to-sign/; Wayne Washington, Ex-Felon Bill, With Financial
Constraints, Awaits Signature—or Veto, GAINESVILLE SUN (May 7, 2019, 5:44 PM), https://www.
gainesville.com/news/20190507/ex-felon-bill-with-financial-constraints-awaits-signature—orveto; see also, Editorial, Why Are Florida Republicans So Afraid of People Voting?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/opinion/sunday/florida-vote.html.
210. See Lawrence Mower, Florida Supreme Court Issues Setback for Amendment 4
Supporters, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.tampabay.com/floridapolitics/buzz/2020/01/16/florida-supreme-court-issues-setback-for-amendment-4-supporters/;
P.R. Lockhart, A Controversial Florida Law Stops Some Former Felons From Voting. A Judge Just
Blocked Part of It., VOX (Oct. 19, 2019, 2:53 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/
2019/7/2/20677955/amendment-4-florida-felon-voting-rights-lawsuits-fines-fees; see also, Jeffrey
Schweers, ‘New Beginning’ for Florida Felons: Registrations Continue Amid Voting Rights Fight,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Nov. 21, 2019, 10:28 AM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/
news/local/state/2019/11/21/florida-felons-still-registering-amidst-amendment-4-legal-battle/422
3319002/.

B - PARTELOW (DO NOT DELETE)

452

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

3/2/2020 9:39 AM

[Vol. 47:3

III. Disenfranchisement for Unpaid Legal Financial Obligations
While the number of states that permanently disenfranchise individuals
with felony convictions has decreased in recent years, the practice of
restricting the voting rights of ex-offenders who still owe legal financial
obligations (“LFOs”) remains shockingly prevalent. According to a 2019
survey by the Civil Rights Clinic at Georgetown Law School, 30 states have
some form of these laws on their books.211 Outstanding LFOs can include
fees or fines attached to a criminal conviction, public citation, or expenses
incurred during the course of legal proceedings or in the course of an
individual’s incarceration.212 Sometimes these payments are related to the
underlying charge, but other times they are merely a revenue source for the
courts.213 High interest rates and late fees can often compound debts.214
States can statutorily tie LFO obligations to disenfranchisement in two
ways. The first type is categorized by a 2016 report as “direct” LFO
disenfranchisement, where the disenfranchisement statute specifically
requires repayment of these obligations for regaining the right to vote.215 Of
the thirty states that engage in LFO disenfranchisement, eight have laws that
explicitly state a person’s voting rights are revoked if LFOs are unpaid.216
Others engage in “de facto” LFO disenfranchisement, where the state does
not specifically require LFO repayment as a condition of reenfranchisement, but effectively does so by mandating completion of
probation or parole, and subsequently requires LFO repayment as a condition
of that completion.217
Paying off these debts can be extremely difficult for people recently
released from prison for various socioeconomic reasons. Individuals are
often caught in a cycle of debt where, even if the amount owed is minimal,
people may struggle to pay. Many jurisdictions also charge interest when
the debt goes unpaid, causing the debt to accumulate. Simultaneously, as
211. GEORGETOWN LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC, CAN’T PAY, CAN’T VOTE: A NATIONAL
SURVEY ON THE MODERN POLL TAX 21 (2019), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/201907/CLC_CPCV_Report_Final_0.pdf ; see also, Karin Martin & Anne Stuhldreher, These People
Have Been Barred From Voting Today Because They’re In Debt, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016, 3:00
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/08/they-served-their-time-but
-many-ex-offenders-cant-vote-if-they-still-owe-fines/.
212. FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 4, at 5.
213. Id. at 11.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 7.
216. While most of the states with direct disenfranchisement for unpaid LFOs are in the former
Confederacy, Connecticut, Washington State, and Arizona also have these statutes on their books.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46a(a) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.520 (2019); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-912 (20129); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-905; see also, GEORGETOWN LAW
CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC, supra note 211, at 21.
217. GEORGETOWN LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC, supra note 211, at 25; FREDERICKSEN &
LASSITER, supra note 4, at 7.
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these debts only increase, many incarcerated people are not able to work for
pay, and those that can are paid at alarmingly low rates, sometimes less than
fifty cents an hour.218 Criminal records can make it difficult for people to
find jobs, and without a source of income, the released individual will
struggle to pay bills and put food on the table. Choosing between essentials
such as food and shelter or court-ordered debts is not a difficult choice to
make.219 As interest accrues, the cycle of debt continues. Some states also
have provisions where unpaid LFOs carry prison time.220 Even in states
where courts are required to inquire into a person’s ability to pay before
assessing a LFO, many effectively ignore this obligation.
Although critics and Democratic politicians have widely noted the
similarities between the poll tax and LFO voting requirements,221 especially
in the wake of the 2019 Florida imposition,222 courts have all but
unanimously rejected arguments that the practice is unconstitutional under
both the Equal Protection Clause and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. The
Fourth,223 Sixth,224 Ninth,225 and Eleventh226 circuits, for example, all have

218. Ruben J. Garcia, U.S. Prisoners’ Strike is a Reminder How Common Inmate Labor Is,
CBS News (Sept. 3, 2018, 5:51AM) (“Inmates have claimed in lawsuits that they earned as little
as 12 cents an hour—or nothing as all, as is legal in some states.”); Daniel Moritz-Rabson, ‘Prison
Slavery’: Inmates Are Paid Cents While Manufacturing Products Sold To Government,
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 28, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/prison-slavery-who-benefitscheap-inmate-labor-1093729.
219. Nareissa Smith, No Money, No Vote: How Imposed Fines, Fees and Costs Keep Black
People From Voting, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (Nov. 30, 2017), https://atlantablackstar.com/2017
/11/30/no-money-no-vote-imposed-fines-fees-cost-keep-black-people-voting/.
220. FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 4, at 10.
221. See, e.g., Cory Booker (@CoryBooker), TWITTER (Apr. 24, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://
twitter.com/CoryBooker/status/1121196374840754176 (“This is a poll tax.”); Hillary Clinton
(@HillaryClinton), TWITTER (May 7, 2019, 11:52 AM), https://twitter.com/HillaryClinton/status/
1125835719488999425 (“No one should have their right to vote taken away because of fines. The
Florida GOP’s measure requiring people to pay court-ordered fees before regaining access to the
ballot is a modern-day poll tax unworthy of our democracy.”); Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC),
TWITTER (March 19, 2019, 11:56 AM), https://twitter.com/AOC/status/1108083568918564865
(“A poll tax by any other name . . .”).
222. Dartunorro Clark, Florida on Verge of Blocking Some Ex-Felons from Voting. Critics
Call It a Poll Tax., NBC NEWS (May 3, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/pol
itics-news/florida-verge-blocking-some-ex-felons-voting-critics-call-it-n1001916.
223. Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that Virginia’s $10 fee to
begin the process of civil rights restoration did not violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment).
224. Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746-51 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that Tennessee’s law
requiring the payment of victim restitution and outstanding child support as a precondition to
restoration of voting rights did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment).
225. Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2010).
226. Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206, 1209–10 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that Florida’s policy of
reinstating felons’ voting rights based solely on the discretion of an Executive Clemency Board did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
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explicitly held that states are able to enact barriers to reinstating the franchise
for ex-felons, including requiring full payment of LFO obligations.
Indeed, nearly every court considering the question has dismissed equal
protection and Twenty-Fourth Amendment claims regarding LFO
requirements227 because Richardson provides a carve-out from Harper,
whereby felons no longer have a fundamental right to vote.228 Rather, these
cases deal with the restoration of a fundamental right, rather than a denial of
a fundamental right.229 Accordingly, instead of applying a form of
heightened scrutiny, they apply the deferential rational basis test to find that
these laws are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.230 These courts
have held that the states have a rational basis “for restoring voting rights to
only those felons who have completed the terms of their sentences, which
includes the payment of any fines or restitution orders.”231 Even though
these requirements might seriously affect the ability of certain felons to vote
“based on . . . differing income statuses,”232 the fact that they are felons, and
therefore within the purview of Richardson and its progeny, takes the LFO
requirements outside of the scope of Harper’s prohibition of conditioning
the vote based on wealth.

IV. Eliminating the Twenty-First Century Poll Tax
The Court has never explicitly reconciled its decisions regarding felon
disenfranchisement in Richardson and Hunter with Harper’s much broader
decision decrying the per se unconstitutionality of conditioning voting on
payment of a fee.
Although lower courts have held that LFO
disenfranchisement is governed under the Richardson line of cases, these
courts err in not giving Harper and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment greater
weight in deciding the constitutionality of this practice.
Despite cases upending voting rights in recent years, the Court has
“retained a sound intuition” that Harper and the prohibition on the poll tax
“has deep roots in our current constitutional order, and that it would be a
grievous mistake to cut our mooring lines to this particular triumph of the
civil rights era.”233 As David Schultz and Sarah Clark argue, this should

227. Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 377.
228. See, e.g., Johnson, 624 F.3d at 746; Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 766-69 (Wash. 2007).
For a more nuanced understanding of the subtle differences in the facts and holdings of these
particular cases, see Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 387–96 (2012).
229. Cammett, supra note 228, at 388.
230. See, e.g., Madison, 163 P.3d at 772; Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079.
231. Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079.
232. Madison, 163 P.3d at 769.
233. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 134; see also, Modesire, supra note 162, at 438
(noting that the hard won victories of the Civil Rights Movement “became the springboard for the
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be extended to our collective understanding of the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment as “a rejection of [the] linkage between wealth and voting, and
a severing of the assumption that property or income is a prerequisite to
having a political voice.”234
Although Harper did not explicitly rely on the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment in its opinion, both Harper and the text of the amendment, when
taken together, provide a “superprecedent” in our constitutional canon
against abridging voter qualifications based on wealth, which deserves far
greater deference by courts than it has been given to date.235 Popular
understanding is that Harper’s failure to mention the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment and its expansive read of the Fourteenth severely limited the
Twenty Fourth’s legal effect. However, this misunderstands the history of
the Harper decision. As Bruce Ackerman and Jennifer Nou explain, Harper
should be read in conjunction with the Twenty-Fourth Amendment as
enshrining the struggles of the New Deal and Civil Rights-eras to end wealth
discrimination in the nation’s constitutional fabric.236
The practice of LFO disenfranchisement amounts to a poll tax within
the contemplation of both the text of the constitution and monumental
Supreme Court precedent that provides the capstone to the struggles of the
New Deal and the Civil Rights Movement. Like the postbellum poll taxes
in the South, disenfranchising individuals who owe financial obligations to
the state discriminates on the basis of race and the basis of wealth. Like the
poll tax, it has a disproportionate effect on people of color and those who
would vote against the calcified economic interests in state legislatures.
Disenfranchising otherwise qualified voters due to financial obligations
“may today be strictly localized,” but “its results are felt by the nation as a
whole.”237 This “differential in voting requirements affects both the
economic and political life of the nation.”238
Courts have incorrectly framed the issue of LFO disenfranchisement
by failing to take into account the “superprecedent” of the poll-tax
prohibition. Although a state may deny felons the right to vote for any
period of time, it does not follow that once a state enacts processes whereby
an individual may regain his franchise rights, those processes may be

final legal assault in the Jim Crow laws which had deprived African Americans the vote since
Reconstruction”).
234. Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 377.
235. See Speck, supra note 199, at 1566 (“Douglas Mentions the Twenty-fourth Amendment
nowhere in his opinion, but the Amendment and Harper fit together tightly.”).
236. See generally Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 134–35.
237. BONTECOU, supra note 21, at 4.
238. Id.
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conducted in arbitrary and discriminatory ways that fail to comport with
the other provisions of the Constitution.239
This Article argues that the practice should be deemed both an
impermissible poll tax under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment as well as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Richardson notwithstanding. Part
IV.A. describes how courts should view LFO disenfranchisement through
the lens of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment as the framers envisioned it, and
Part IV.B. then describes how courts should properly conduct an Equal
Protection Clause analysis of LFO disenfranchisement provisions.
A. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment – A Constitutional Sleeping Giant

Although in the last decades lawyers have made efforts to employ the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment in litigation about a number of voting rights
issues, including voter identification laws, these efforts have been sporadic
and unpersuasive to courts.240 To this day, the only restriction struck down
under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment was the Virginia proof-of-residency
requirement in Harman.241 Although courts and the public at large view the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment as a footnote or a forgotten piece of history
aimed at one specific practice, this fundamentally ignores the history of the
movement to abolish the poll tax, as well as the intentions of the
amendment’s framers. Evidence in both the language of the amendment as
well as its legislative history suggests that it was meant to be a dynamic and
adaptable part of the constitution.
The language of the amendment suggests it should be broadly
construed. Critically, the amendment prohibits the right of citizens to vote
in federal elections from being “denied or abridged” on account “of failure
to pay any poll tax or any other tax.”242 As the legislative history, Supreme
Court decision in Harman, and academic commentators have noted, the “any
other tax” provision should be construed broadly to include other devices
meant to prevent voting based on wealth discrimination, and finally
disposing of the notion that wealth and property should be connected to one’s
ability to participate in democratic self-government.243
239. Judge Karen Nelson Moore’s scathing and well-researched dissent in Johnson, in
particular, provides a compelling analysis of why LFO disenfranchisement violates both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 756,
760 (6th Cir. 2010) (Moore, J., dissenting). Much of the analysis, infra, is structured around and
supplements her forceful arguments.
240. Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 376.
241. Id. at 404.
242. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, §1.
243. See Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 416; Speck, supra note 199, at 1556 (“[The
Amendment] creates a broad, absolute prohibition on voter qualifications that in any way implicate
economic means. The Supreme Court’s response to states’ attempts to circumvent the poll tax ban
illustrates a broad reading of the Twenty-fourth amendment.”); see also, Schultz & Clark, supra
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The popular legal canon suggests that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
remains as a vestigial organ of the constitution that no longer has a function
in the post-Harper jurisprudence.244 This, however, misreads both the
intentions of the framers of the amendment and Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the topic of the poll tax.
Much of the legislative and executive history of the amendment
suggests that both the amendment’s framers and President Johnson
anticipated that the amendment would be construed broadly to apply beyond
the traditional poll-tax requirement.245 These floor statements by the
amendment’s supporters wholeheartedly decry not just the poll tax as it was
being practiced at the time, but the practice of “pay[ing] for the right to
vote.”246 Congressman Dante Fascell, a Democrat from Florida, perhaps
summarized this sentiment best: “[T]he payment of money, whether directly
or indirectly, whether in a small amount or in a large amount, should never
be permitted to reign as a criterion of democracy. There should not be
allowed a scintilla of this in our free society.”247 President Johnson also
remarked upon the amendment’s passage that it stood for the proposition that
“there can be no one too poor to vote.”248 It is curious, then, why courts and
practitioners have been so hesitant to use the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to
challenge “equivalent or milder substitutes” to the poll tax, when these

note 11, at 419 (suggesting that a “poll tax or other tax” should be read to include any monetized
cost which “directly or indirectly imposes an additional cost on voters in their casting of a vote
such that it would discourage individuals from voting”).
244. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1459, 1481–82 (2001) (“[T]he net effect of the Twenty-fourth Amendment was, at most, to
abolish the poll tax in federal elections, in a few states, two years before it would have been
abolished across the board anyway.”); Speck, supra note 199, at 1566 (“Harper thus appears to
essentially obviate any practical need for the Twenty-fourth Amendment.”).
245. Friedman, supra note 52, at 364.
246. 108 CONG. REC. 17, 662 (1962) (statement of Rep. Joelson); see also, id. at 4154
(statement of Sen. Holland); id. at 4585 (statement of Sen. Yarborough) (noting that the amendment
would prohibit his state’s practice of “unjustly discriminat[ing] against people of limited means”);
id. at 17,657 (statement of Rep. Fascell) (stating that the struggle to abolish the poll tax was a
struggle to ensure “that no American must pay for the privilege of exercising his constitutional
privilege—the right to vote”); id. at 17,660 (statement of Rep. Baldwin) (“I hope [the amendment]
will be passed by an overwhelming vote. No person should have to pay for the privilege of
voting.”); id. at 17,665 (statement of Rep. Addabbo) (“I believe it is our responsibility to at least
give to all those qualified to vote the right to do so without having to pay for that right and to
continue to work for the moral rights of all.”); id. (statement of Rep. Dingell) (noting that the text
of the amendment “prohibits other taxes being used as a device to evade the legislative purpose of
the amendment”).
247. 108 CONG. REC. 17,657 (1962) (statement of Rep. Fascell).
248. Nan Robertson, 24th Amendment Becomes Official – Johnson Hails Anti-Poll Tax
Document at Ceremonies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 1964), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/times
machine/1964/02/05/97168103.html.
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practices are precisely what its congressional sponsors, the president, and
even the Supreme Court indicated the amendment prohibits.249
Although courts and practitioners have been slow to use the TwentyFourth Amendment as intended by its framers, academics and commentators
have begun to recognize the amendment for its potential as a sleeping giant
of great constitutional significance.250 Accordingly, courts should not
hesitate to apply Harman and the amendment’s legislative history to strike
down poll taxes, substitutes for the poll tax, and—critically— “any other
tax” that denies or abridges voting rights.251
Once distilled, the principles at issue in both Harman and the legislative
history of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment evidence that LFO
disenfranchisement is plainly within the meaning of the amendment’s text as
drafted by its framers. If the test for the “any other tax” provision is the same
as, or similar to, the test deployed in Harman, a plaintiff would need to
demonstrate that a restriction imposes a material requirement solely upon
those who refuse to surrender their constitutional right to vote in federal
elections without paying “a tax.” The two questions that must be answered
in a Twenty-Fourth Amendment inquiry, therefore, are: (1) whether LFO
disenfranchisement schemes either “abridge” or “deny” the right to vote, and
(2) whether LFOs constitute a “tax” within the meaning of the Amendment.
As to the first question, courts weighing the issue have decided that
LFO restrictions for convicted felons do not abridge or deny the right to vote
because, by the language of Richardson and Hunter, felons do not have a
fundamental right to vote in the first place. These courts fail to note,
however, that this principle is distinguishable by reading the “affirmative
sanction” of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction with the
Twenty-Fourth. Because the Twenty-Fourth was enacted nearly one
hundred years after the Fourteenth, the language of the Fourteenth—which
affirms the ability of states to deny voting rights to felons—should be subject
to the later-enacted constitutional text, including that a state may not deny or
abridge these rights in a way that constitutes “a poll tax or any other tax.”
249. Harman v. Forsenius, 380 U.S. 528, 542 (1965).
250. See, e.g., Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 136 (“[C]ourts are duty bound to take [the
constitutional principles behind Harper and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment] with high seriousness
as they struggle to interpret the constitutional meaning of democracy in the twenty-first century.”);
id. at 145 (“[W]e believe that it is past time for the Supreme Court to admit Twenty-Four into the
constitutional canon.”); Schultz & Clark, supra note 11, at 420 (“[T]he broader purpose of the
Twenty-fourth Amendment is to break the linkage between wealth and democracy in the United
States.”); Wood & Trivedi, supra note 5, at 43–45; Speck, supra note 199, at 1567–68.
251. Harman considered only restrictions that “imposed a material requirement solely upon
those who refuse to surrender their constitutional right to vote without paying a poll tax.” 380 U.S.
at 541. The Court, however, has never interpreted the other clause of the amendment, which states
that the vote may not be denied or abridged by reason of failure to pay “any other tax.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XXIV, §1.
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By the plain language of Richardson and Hunter, a state may deny
felons the right to vote as a category so long as it does not enact these
disenfranchisement statutes in an explicitly discriminatory manner. But
states that re-extend the franchise to felons on the condition that they have
paid LFOs have re-conferred a fundamental right to these individuals.252 It
follows that when states regrant the right to vote only to some formerly
incarcerated people, those individuals who have not paid their LFOs could
vote but for their failure to pay these obligations. The right to vote for people
who have not paid the LFOs, therefore, is “abridged” by that failure to pay.
The second question is whether these fines constitute a “tax” within the
meaning of the amendment. To understand what the amendment means by
“other tax,” courts should first be “guided by the principle that ‘[t]he
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from
technical meaning.’”253 A “tax” is defined as “a compulsory contribution to
state revenue, levied by the government on workers’ income and business
profits, or added to the cost of some goods, services, and transactions.”
While LFOs may be better classified as “fees” or “debts” rather than a
“tax” in the literal sense, Harman makes clear that the amendment prohibits
not just the practice of the direct poll tax, but also the practice of setting a
price for voting.254 The similarities between LFO disenfranchisement and
the classic “poll tax” at issue in the Harman decision show that LFO
disenfranchisement amounts to a “tax on voting” within the meaning of the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment.
Given that the Supreme Court may now be more open to arguments
about the legislative history of the statutes and constitutional provisions they
interpret,255 it is useful to conduct an analysis of the amendment’s legislative
history for what exactly constitutes a “tax” within the meaning of the
amendment. This history suggests that LFO payments fall within the
meaning of the amendment’s text. For example, the committee report from
252. See DIMINO ET AL., supra note 138, at 43; Cammett, supra note 228, at 388.
253. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (quoting United States v. Sprague,
282 U.S. 716, 731 1931) (alteration in original); see also, Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 768
(2010) (Moore, J., dissenting).
254. Harman, 380 U.S. at 541.
255. Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dead at 79, POLITICO (Feb. 13,
2016, 5:14 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/breaking-news-supreme-court-justiceantonin-scalia-dead-at-the-age-of-79-219246. Justice Scalia had a career-long distrust of legislative
history, see generally James J. Brudney & Corey Dislear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008),
whereas his successor, Justice Gorsuch, makes use of it; see Max Alderman & Duncan Pickard,
Symposium, Justice Scalia’s Heir Apparent?, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 185 (discussing how thenJudge Gorsuch turned to ‘“traditional tools of statutory interpretation in an effort to discern
Congress’s meaning,’ including legislative history—a striking departure from Justice Scalia’s
textualism”).
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the House of Representatives noted that the amendment would extend far
beyond the quintessential poll tax and “would . . . prevent both the United
States and any State from setting up any substitute in lieu of a poll tax.”256
This included “preventing the nullification of the amendment’s effect by a
resort to subterfuge.”257 This language and intent suggest that states could
not avoid implicating the amendment by repackaging the poll tax by another
means outside the technical definition of a “poll tax” or “other tax.”
Additionally, debates surrounding the amendment in both houses
suggest that its sponsors believed that the “other tax” language would
encompass all payments to the government generally, even if not technically
within the definition of a “tax.” For example, Representative Gonzalez
indicated that “there should not be any price tag or any other kind of tag on
the right to vote.”258 Representative Fascell understood the amendment to
make clear that “the payment of money whether directly or indirectly,
whether in a small amount or in a large amount should never be permitted to
reign as a criterion of democracy.”259 Representative Joelson noted that the
amendment sought to target “areas in which American citizens are required
to pay for the right to vote.”260 Representative Halpern noted his hope that
the amendment would “outlaw[] th[e] undemocratic, feudal practice of
placing a price tag on the right to vote.”261 Finally, Senator Javits spoke of
the amendment’s elimination of any “encumbrance” bearing the “character”
of the poll tax.262
Furthermore, by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the amendment’s
text in Harman, the amendment’s purpose was to prohibit “sophisticated as
well as simple minded” attempts to deny the vote to the poor and the
indigent. It is apparent that the amendment’s drafters and the Harman Court
meant the amendment to be not a vestigial piece of constitutional language
aimed at a practice that had been diminished in all but four states, but to
extend to reach all denials or abridgments of the right to vote by reason of
failure to pay a monetary obligation, whether technically structured as a tax,
fee, or debt. Because the payment of LFOs “exact[s] a price for the privilege
of exercising the franchise,”263 it certainly bears the “character” of a tax on
voting.264 LFOs are a “forced monetary contribution paid to the government
256. H.R. Rep. No. 87 – 1821 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4033 (1962).
257. 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4037.
258. Abolition of Poll Tax in Federal Elections: Hearing on H.J. Res. 404, 425, 434, 594, 601,
632, 655, 663, 670, & S.J. Res. 29 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1962).
259. 108 CONG. REC. 17657 (1962).
260. Id. at 17662.
261. Id. at 17661
262. Id. at 4155.
263. Harman v. Forsenius, 380 U.S. 528, 539 (1965).
264. 108 Cong. Rec. at 4155.
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for the benefit of the government or the general public,” which “abridge” the
right to vote, and thus plainly fall within the type of state action prohibited
by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.
B. Equal Protection: Irrational Laws and Uncompelling State Interests

Even if courts fail to see that LFO disenfranchisement is a poll tax
prohibited by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, they should still find the
practice to violate the Equal Protection Clause.265 While Ackerman and Nou
extensively criticize Douglas’s opinion for failing to acknowledge the debt
it owed to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, they
believe that Harper should be read as the “third and final stage of a larger
process through which the American people successfully repudiated wealth
discrimination at the ballot box.”266 Indeed, “we should place Harper in its
higher lawmaking context, and reinterpret it as codifying a larger effort by
the American people, during the 1960s, to create a more egalitarian
democracy. Harper is not the product of an activist Court, but of an activist
people.”267 Because Harper crystallized the popular sovereignty of the
American people—expressed through both a constitutional amendment and
a “super statute”268 —courts need to “take this point with high seriousness as
they struggle to interpret the constitutional meaning of democracy in the
twenty-first century.”269
Furthermore, some scholars stress that Justice Rehnquist’s historical
and originalist arguments may have been off base in Richardson. For
example, Professor Gabriel Chin posits that the Fifteenth Amendment’s
enforcement provision on racial disenfranchisement is inconsistent with
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Fifteenth Amendment
should be understood as repealing, or at least modifying, the language of
Section 2.270 It is equally probable that Justice Rehnquist failed to take into
consideration the clause’s relationship with the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.
If each successive amendment can be understood as taking into consideration
the earlier written constitution, Section 2 should be read with the
understanding that the states may sanction disenfranchisement for “other

265. See Cammett, supra note 228, at 396–402.
266. Ackerman and Nou posit that although it was a mistake and an unfortunate oversight that
Justice Douglas failed to acknowledge the Twenty-Fourth Amendment or Section 10 in his opinion,
they note that the language in the opinion largely repackages the same ideas in Section 10.
Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 110.
267. Id. at 133.
268. See generally, William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J.
1215 (2001).
269. Ackerman & Nou, supra note 52, at 136.
270. Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did
the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259 (2004).
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crimes” but must avoid doing so in a way that constitutes a “poll tax or other
tax” that “denies or abridges” voting rights.
The affirmative sanction of the Fourteenth Amendment, however,
means that states are essentially free to engage in felon disenfranchisement
outside the watchful eye of the Court’s strict scrutiny. Despite the
overwhelming sociological and statistical evidence of the racially disparate
impact that the practice of felon disenfranchisement and the criminal justice
system as a whole have on both people of color and the poor, the plain text
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Richardson’s reading of it essentially
cordon off felon disenfranchisement from equal protection challenges in all
but the rare explicitly discriminatory cases. Richardson essentially
guarantees the constitutionality of state felon disenfranchisement laws.
Thus, any wholesale repeal of this practice will have to come through an
Article V constitutional amendment, the Supreme Court revisiting
Richardson, or through popular pressure on state legislatures to change their
voter qualification laws or criminal codes.
Furthermore, despite Harper’s sweeping language regarding wealth
discrimination, the Court’s subsequent case law has made it abundantly clear
that wealth is not a suspect class.271 These cases, in addition to both
Richardson and Hunter’s findings that felons lack a fundamental right to
vote, means that LFO disenfranchisement provisions are analyzed under
rational basis review rather than strict or intermediate scrutiny.272
For a law to pass rational basis scrutiny, it must be rationally related to
a legitimate government interest.273 Although courts have recognized
legitimate state interests in regard to LFOs, such as ensuring compliance with
court orders and requiring felons to complete terms of their sentence, the
practice of restoring the franchise only to those with the means to pay is
insufficiently related to these interests to survive a rational basis analysis.
Indeed, “preconditioning suffrage on a payment that a person is unable to
make is [not] in any rational way related to the government’s interest in
promoting that payment.”274
Regarding the first state interest, Supreme Court precedent suggests that
restrictions that fail to take into account those who are unable but willing to
pay are disfavored,275 especially when done with an ancillary connection to
271. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 2, 29 (1973).
272. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 564–68
(5th ed. 2015).
273. Id.
274. Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 756 (2010) (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
275. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662 (1983) (holding that the state acted
unconstitutionally when it revoked an individual’s probation because he was unable to pay fines
and restitution payments, without a determination that he had made a bona fide effort to pay);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978) (finding that a statute prohibiting individuals who
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276

the purported interest and when a more direct means of asserting the
interest is available.277 Revoking a legal right or privilege from a person who
is unable to make restitution payments “through no fault of his own . . . will
not make restitution suddenly forthcoming.”278 States are effectively forcing
someone who is unable to pay to choose between food on the table and a
vote at the ballot box. Tying repayment to voting rights is unlikely to compel
these individuals to pay their LFOs any more quickly than if the franchise
was not so conditioned. These restrictions “embod[y] nothing more than an
attempt to exercise unbridled power over a clearly powerless group, which
is not a legitimate state interest.”279
A second commonly asserted state interest in upholding LFO
disenfranchisement, that elections need to be protected from felons who
continue to break the law via their noncompliance with court-mandated
payments, is “nothing ‘more than a naked assertion that [a felon’s] poverty
by itself’ is a sufficient reason to disqualify the felon from regaining the right
to participate in the exercise of democracy.”280 Although a state may take
certain things, like “[r]esidence requirements, age, and previous criminal
record”281 into consideration when deciding qualifications for its voters, once
a state allows those with a previous criminal record to restore their right to
vote by completion of a financial payment, it “makes the affluence of the
voter or payment of [a] fee an electoral standard,” which is explicitly
prohibited by Harper.282 By opening the door to some former felons, who
have the means to pay their LFOs, the state “ceases to rely on the felon’s
participation in criminal activity as its basis for withholding the right to vote”
and deems them just as worthy of the franchise as others, but for their ability
to pay their financial obligations.283 Some courts feel that Harper is not
applicable to LFO disenfranchisement, as the Harper Court applied strict
scrutiny, rather than rational basis review, due to the fundamental nature of
the voting right at issue. The Supreme Court’s analogous rational basis
cases, however, lend further support to the notion that Harper provides a per
se constitutional ban on conditioning the franchise on payment of a fee.284

had failed to pay child support payments from getting married violated Equal Protection as applied
to individuals who were unable to make the payments).
276. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985).
277. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389–90.
278. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670.
279. Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 758 (2010) (Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
280. Id. (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671).
281. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974).
282. Harper v. Va. Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966); see also Johnson, 624 U.S. at
758-59.
283. Johnson, 624 U.S. at 759.
284. See supra notes 272, 275–83.
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A third commonly asserted state interest is ensuring that felons
complete the terms of their sentence. The Supreme Court has ruled,
however, that states may not put into place “unreasoned distinctions”285 in
pursuing this interest once they have established the means for doing so.
Additionally, according to Griffin v. Illinois,286 states may not
“discriminate[] against some convicted [felons] on account of their
poverty.”287 In Williams v. Illinois,288 for example, the Court ostensibly used
rational basis review in ruling that states cannot extend an individual’s prison
term based on their inability to pay a fine.289 So too with LFO
disenfranchisement; the state is extending a felon’s period of
disenfranchisement solely because of the involuntary nonpayment of
financial obligations. It is plainly “not rational to achieve” a legitimate or
substantial state interest “in a manner that discriminates against particular
felons on the basis of their wealth.”290
Lastly, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez291 is
commonly cited by courts in holding that these LFO requirements pass
constitutional muster, as the Supreme Court explicitly held that wealth is not
a suspect class. The Court, however, stated that Williams is controlling when
individuals, because of their indigency, “are completely unable to pay for
some desired benefit” and “as a consequence, they sustain[] an absolute
deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.”292 The Court
has limited Griffin to cases in which the government has “a legal or a
practical monopoly” over the benefit sought.293 Individuals who are
disenfranchised due to an inability to pay their LFOs clearly fall within this
category.
Rational basis, although a deferential standard, should be applied “with
bite” in cases where individual rights are at stake.294 Although courts are
hesitant to strike down these LFO repayment laws due to the ability of the
legislative process to curtail any perceived wrongs, as Justice Marshall noted
in his Richardson dissent, those with felony convictions are a politically
unpopular group, meaning if the courts do not step in to protect their rights
under the constitution, “it is unlikely that anyone else will carry the banner
for them.”295 Once states open the door for felons to regain their franchise
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 111 (1996).
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 18 (plurality opinion).
399 U.S. 235 (1970).
Id.
Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 761 (2010).
411 U.S. 1 (1972).
Id. at 20.
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 460 (1988).
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 272, at 706.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 83 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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rights, they must do so in ways that do not discriminate on the basis of
wealth. To do otherwise is not consistent with Harper or the court’s larger
equal protection jurisprudence.

Conclusion
The Framers, with all their many faults, fundamentally changed the
world with their vision of a constitutional republic where “the electors are to
be the great body of the people of the United States,” “[n]ot the rich, more
than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant.”296 Alexis de
Tocqueville once lauded the spirit of the American republic as a society
characterized by a “general equality of condition” across the country.297 The
Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections cemented the American people’s
attempt to enshrine that principle into a superprecedent in our constitutional
fabric.
When a person is released from prison, common wisdom suggests that
they have paid their debt to society.
The current practice of
disenfranchisement over unpaid legal financial obligations, however, means
that individuals are often locked in a cycle of debt where they perpetually
pay for their crimes by exchanging their right to participate in our
democracy. The post-bellum roots of this practice, like the poll tax before
it, suggest that LFO disenfranchisement, and felon disenfranchisement more
broadly, are an attempt to further race and wealth discrimination at the ballot
box and centralize white supremacy in American society. This system of
disenfranchisement silences the political voices of vulnerable people, and
has the potential to drastically affect the upcoming elections in 2020 and
beyond. It is crucial then that courts, legislatures, and the American people
work to realize the inherent principle of equality in American society that
DeToqueville so admired, and which the New Deal and Civil Rights eras
helped to cement in our national consciousness. We must not hesitate to call
the practice of LFO disenfranchisement what it is—an unconstitutional
twenty-first century poll tax.

296. THE FEDERALIST no. 57 (James Madison). The irony of the man who wrote this eloquent
statement being a slaver and an architect of the three-fifths compromise is not lost on the author of
this Article. See Noah Feldman, James Madison’s Lessons in Racism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/opinion/sunday/james-madison-racism.html.
297. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3 (1835).
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